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CORPORATE VOTING: MAJORITY CONTROL

T

HE traditional corporate set-up is based upon the democracy of the dollar-one share, one vote; majority con-

trol. 1 With respect to the large publicly owned corporations

it is no longer true that control is necessarily exercised by
the stockholders who have invested the largest capital in
the enterprise.2 This result has been achieved in part by
the use of various legal devices, such as non-voting stock,
but more important, in practice, is the generality with which
control is exercised by the owners of a minority of even the
voting stock.' Because of such factors as widespread ownership, 4 inertia and disinterest in management, 5 and inacces'State v. Gray, 20 Ohio App. 26, 153 N. E. 187 (1925). The use of no par
stock in part destroys this concept because, unless otherwise expressly provided,
each share of stock is entitled to one vote regardless of its par value, State v.

Kinkead, 113 Ohio St. 487, 149 N. E. 697 (1925). The original common law
view that each stockholder is entitled to only one vote regardless of the number
of shares owned by him (Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L. 222 (1834) ; Matter
of Rochester Dist. Tele. Co., 40 Hun 172 (N. Y. 1886); Commonwealth v.
Conover, 10 Phila. 55 (Pa. 1873) was abandoned in the earliest days of business corporations, but such voting may still be permissible (Op. Atty. Gen.
N. Y. 1910) 406; North Dakota Civil Code, §4534; Washington, Rem. Code,
§3812). The move away from the man to his investment was also marked
by the allowance of proxy voting which is now universal but which was not
permitted at common law, Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014
(1912) ; Commonwealth v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134 (1883). The derivation of
the notion of "majority rule" from politics is obvious; its validity as a social
ideal is beyond the scope of this article.
2 Only 22 of the 200 largest corporations in the United States are controlled
by majority owners, BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 94.
1134 of said 200 corporations are controlled by the management and by
minority stockholders, BERLE AND MEANS, 10C. cit. si pra note 2. The writer
has in course of preparation an article on Perpetuating Control.
' At the end of 1931, over 4,000,000 persons owned the common stock of the
65 leading corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Some average individual holdings were: U. S. Steel, 49.9 shares; Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
29 shares; General Motors Corp., 14.7 shares. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1932,
Part 2, at 9. The first indication of a check in the trend towards widespread
stock ownership occurred during the third quarter of 1932 when U. S. Steel,
General Motors, and other large corporations showed the smallest increase in
number of common stockholders experienced since 1928 (N. Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1932, Part 4, at 1, Dec. 14, 1932, at 16), but even at that time it was estimated
that 88% of the owners of common stock in 48 representative American Corporations owned less than 100 shares each (ibid.). For a discussion of the
means of union available to small security holders, see Rohrlich, Protective
Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 670.
' The average stockholder in the large corporations is primarily interested
in financial return; when apprehensive of the management he sells his stock.
These and other considerations seem to call for a sharper distinction in corpo-
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sible places of meeting, 6 the "privilege of voting" has become
largely "theoretical."

7

However, the power to control un-

questionably resides with the owners of the majority of the
voting stock." At times of stress, this power, normally quiescent, asserts itself in full vigor 9 and it is important to understand its nature and the limitations to which it is subject.
STATUTORY ' 0 AND CHARTER LIMITATIONS.
.None of the cynicism towards the importance of corpolate voting elsewhere rampant has entered the courts. In
the opinions of the judges the right to vote is "a property
right," "a vested interest," "a vital right," "an inherent
right," "an essential attribute" of the stock itself, a right
of "substantial value," indeed, the stockholder's "supreme
right and main protection." 11
Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the language
quoted, it is not surprising in view of the statutory nature
of the modern corporation itself 1Ia that statutory restric-

ration law between "public" corporations and "close" corporations. See Book
Review (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 714; Rohrlich, Sidts in Equity by Minority
Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Control (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv.
692, 727; SPELLMAN, CORPORATE DIRECTORS (1931) §9.
6 Stockholders' meetings are generally held in the state of incorporation but
that state is not usually chosen because it is the place of residence of most
stockholders. See "WHY CORPORATIONS LEAVE HOmE" (The Corporation
Trust Company, 1929).
DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 628; see also
Andrews, Our "Voting" Stock (1932) 8 VA. Q. REv. 400.
' The word "majority" is used in this article to indicate the vote legally
necessary to adopt a course of conduct; that may be 51%, 66 2/3% or 75%.
"Control" is ordinarily exercised by the election of friendly directors; on special
questions, such as mergers, dissolution, etc., by direct vote.
'The New York World-Telegram has published a series of short articles
on recent proxy battles (October 31-November 5, 1932). At this writing the
press is reporting a vigorous contest for control of Aviation Corporation.
"0Not to extend this article unduly, reference to the ordinary routine matters with respect to meetings and voting usually contained in corporation statutes is omitted.
n Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090 (1906);
Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (1909);
Kinnan v. Sullivan County Club, 26 App. Div. 213, 50 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1st
Dept. 1898); Page v. Amer. & Br. Mfg. Co., 129 App. Div. 346, 113 N. Y.
Supp. 734 (1st Dept. 1908) ; State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188 (1883) ; Hays v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 518 (1876); Baker's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 461 (1885).
"a Prior to the American Revolution, corporations were generally created
by royal charter rather than by Act of Parliament. See Warren, Safeguarding
the Creditors of Corporations (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 509, 515.
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tions upon voting rights have been sustained. 12 It has been
held that the majority do not have such a vested right in
their voting power as to invalidate a statutory amendment
providing for cumulative voting designed to give the minority representation upon the board of directors. 13 Conversely,
the minority do not have such a vested right in the benefits
of cumulative voting sufficient to prevent a reduction in the
number of directors which would make it necessary for more
shareholders to combine in order to obtain representation on
14
the board.
The corporation itself may not change voting rights as
fixed by statute. 15 Where the statute provides that the directors shall be elected by the stockholders, a vote may not
be given to bondholders.' 6 Nor may a statutory provision
that such election be by a plurality vote be changed by a
charter provision requiring a unanimous vote.' 7 And where
the statute provides for annual elections of directors, the
charter may not create a permanent, self-perpetuating
8
board.'
Under a constitutional provision providing that "every
shareholder shall have the right to vote," non-voting preferred stock may not be issued.' 9
E. g., limiting voting power to residents, State v. Hunton, 28 Vt. 594
(1856) ; limiting number of votes to be cast by any one stockholder, Mack v.
DeBardeleben Coal & Iron Co., 90 Ala. 396, 8 So. 150 (1890).
11Atty. Gen. v. Looker, 111 Mich. 498, 69 N.:W. 929 (1897), aff'd, sub-noma
Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 21 Sup. Ct. 21 (1900) ; cf. Hays v. Commonwealth; Baker's Appeal; State v. Greer, all supra note 11; Commonwealth v.
Butterworth, 160 Pa. St. 55, 28 Atl. 507 (1894) ; Dick v. Lehigh Valley R. R.
Co., 4 Pa. Dist. 56 (1894); Commonwealth v. Flannery, 203 Pa. St. 28, 52 Atl.
129 (1902); Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 64 Fed. 272 (C. C. Kan.
1894). For an explanation of "cumulative voting," see Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 150 (1883).
On the subject of charter amendments, see
Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927)
75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 585, 723; Cades, Constitutional and Equitable Limitations

on the Power of the Majority to Amend Charters (1928)

77 U.

OF

PA. L.

REv. 256.

" Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 425
(lst Dept. 1910).
" Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15 (1869).
"6Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., 167 App. Div. 669, 152 N. Y. Supp. 803 (1st
354, 40 N. E. 626 (1895) ; cf. State v.
Dept. 1913) ; Durkee v. People, 155 Ill.
McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354 (1872).
" Matter of Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 430 (1st Dept. 1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N. E. 910 (1921).
State v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N. E.207 (1903).
"Brooks v. State, 29 Del. 1, 79 Atl. 790 (1911) ; People v. Emmerson, 302
Ill.
300, 134 N. E. 707 (1922). Contra: State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89
S. W. 872 (1905). The Delaware constitutional provision relied on in the
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the cer-

tificate of incorporation gave each stockholder one vote for
each share owned and provided that the directors might grant
one vote to each policyholder insured for not less than $5,000.
Some years later, the legislature enacted a law providing
that the directors with the consent of a majority of the stockholders might confer upon policyholders the right to vote for
all or any lesser number of directors. Thereupon the directors with the necessary concurrence of stockholders sought
to confer the right to vote for 28 out of 52 directors upon
the policyholders and to limit the stockholders to the right
to vote for 24 directors. The court held the legislative act
valid in view of the "mutualization" features contained in
the original certificate of incorporation but held the action
taken thereunder as invalid because it construed the statute
as permitting the granting of a vote to policyholders but not
2
as authorizing the denial of any vote to the stockholders. 0a
In the absence of controlling statutes the extent to which
voting rights may be curtailed by charter or by-law is largely
one of "public policy." 21 Generally, the charter may provide for non-voting classes of stock 22 and may limit the numBrooks case was repealed in 1903. Non-voting stock may be issued where thegoverning statute authorizes the creation of two or more classes of stock "with
such designations * * * voting powers or restrictions * * *" as may be stated in
the certificate of incorporation, Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So.
790 (1921) ; infra note 22. Many statutes thus authorize the issuance of nonvoting stock (e. g., Del. Gen. Corp. Act, §17; N. Y. Stock Corp. Law (1929)
§5; Purdon's Pa. St. Tit. 15, §§161, 164) and the proposed Uniform Business
Corporation Act (approved Amer. Bar Assn. 1928, 53 A. B. A. Rep. 92) does
so with a novel addition (§2811) : "If, by the articles of incorporation, voting
power is granted to the holders of shares of a certain class or classes and denied
to the holders of shares of other classes, then the person or persons exercising
such power shall stand in a fiduciary relation to the entire body of shareholders
and shall be responsible to the corporation, for the benefit of all shareholders,
for any violation of the obligations of such relationship."
'Supra note 11.
OaThe Company was thereafter completely mutualized. The Charter was
first amended to permit policyholders and stockholders to vote for all directors
and then the stock was purchased and cancelled, leaving the sole voting power
with the policyholders, see Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 247 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
21The curtailment when sustained is generally on the basis of contract,
consent, or waiver.
People v. Koenig, 133 App. Div. 756, 118 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1st Dept.
1909); General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N. J. Eq. 234,
100 Atl. 347 (1917); Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496
(1890) ; cases cited 21 A. L. R. 643 (1922) ; see also supra note 19.
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ber of votes of any one shareholder. 23 But the corporation
may not issue all of its stock without voting powers, vesting

such power in another body 2 4 or stipulate in advance the
manner in which stockholders shall vote upon matters sub-

mitted to them.2 5 And when once voting power has attached
to stock its relative voting strength may not be reduced
26
without its consent.

SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS-BY CONTRACT.

27

The foregoing indicates that a stockholder's vote may
not be taken from him without his consent, 28 but the law
has gone further and has imposed limitations even on his
own right to deal with it.
He, of course, cannot be compelled to exercise his voting right,20 but, on the other hand, he will not be permitted
Bartlett v. Fourton, 115 La. 26, 38 So. 882 (1905) ; Detwiller v. Commonwealth, 131 Pa. 614, 18 Atl. 990 (1890). Contra: State v. Day, 189 Ind. 243,
123 N. E. 402 (1920).

45 Atl. 622 .(1900).

See also, In re Newark Library Assn., 64 N. J. L. 265,

A charter provision denying the right to vote to share-

holders who are corporations, fiduciaries or infants is valid in the absence of a
controlling statute, Orme v. Salt River Valley Water U. Assn., 25 Ariz. 324,
217 Pac. 935 (1923).
2'Lebus v. Stansifer, 154 Ky. 444, 157 S. W. 727 (1913). This was done
in the case of The Bank for International Settlements; see Reynolds, N. Y.
L. J., Dec. 17, 1932.
' McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank, 164 Ill.
427, 45 N. E. 954 (1897), holding
void a by-law requiring stockholders to vote in favor of proposals to increase
capital made by directors. Cf. Elger v. Boyle, 69 Misc. 273, 126 N. Y. Supp.
846 (1910), sustaining a provision in a will directing executors to vote stock in
a corporation as directed by its directors. But see Randall & Sons, Inc. v.
Lucke, 123 Misc. 5, 205 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1924). See also "Validity and Effect
of Provision in Will to Control Voting Power of Corporate Stock" (1920)
9 A. L. R. 1242, (1921) 17 A. L. R. 238.
- Page v. Amer. & Br. Mfg. Co., supra note 11, holding illegal reduction
in power of common stock resulting from attempted change of capital from
80,000 shares common and 20,000 shares preferred to 20,000 shares of each
where both classes were entitled to vote.
' Charter and by-law provisions are generally treated as in the
of
"contract" limitations, but we shall in this section treat only "true" nature
contracts.
Because of the extensive literature on the subject, we refrain from discussing
"voting trusts." See (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 214; and material cited
Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 673, especially in
connection with this article: Lilienthal, Corporate Voting and Public Policy
(1887) 10 HARv. L. REV. 428; Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting
Stock (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 445.
'Lord v. Equitable Life A. Soc., supra note 11; Page v. Amer. & Br. Mfg.
Co., spra note 11; Elger v. Boyle, supra note 25; Brewster v. Hartley, supra
note 1.?
'See Vandenburgh v. Broadway Ry. Co., 29 Hun 348 (N. Y. 1883);
Schmidt v. Mitchell, 101 Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929 (1897).
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'Thus, it is said a stockholder

may not, for a consideration private and personal to himself
and to which the corporation is a stranger, agree to cast his
vote in a certain prescribed way.3 1 Agreements whereby one
agrees to vote in a particular manner in consideration of his

employment by the corporation accordingly have been held
invalid.3 2 On the other hand "it is not illegal or against
public policy for two or more stockholders owning the majority of the shares of stock to unite upon a course of corporate policy or action, or upon the officers whom they will
elect." 33 Accordingly, agreements to vote for certain persons as directors are valid.3

4

And an agreement substan-

tially giving one stockholder a veto power has been held
valid, at least where all the stockholders were parties to it. 3 5
' This common law rule is sometimes embodied in statute, e. g., N. Y. Stock
Corporation Law (1930) §47, New York Penal Law (1909) §668. The New
York statutory provision that proxies are revocable (N. Y. GEN. 'CORP. LAW
[1929] §19) has, in view of the foregoing, been construed to prevent the creation of a proxy "coupled with an interest," Matter of Germicide Co., 65 Hun
606, 20 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1892). See also, Matter of Glen Salt Co., 17 App.
Div. 234, 45 N. Y. Supp. 568 (3d Dept. 1897), aff'd, 153 N. Y. 688, 48 N. E.
1105 (1897).
The proposed Uniform Business Corporations Act, supra note
19, expressly limits the provision that proxies are revocable to such as are "not
coupled with an interest" (art. 271V).
'Brady v. Bean, 221 Ill. App. 279 (1921) ; Gilchrist v. Hatch, 100 N. E.
473 (Ind. 1913); Guernsey v. Cook, 100 Mass. 501 (1876); Woodruff v.
Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309 (1882); Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306,
104 N. E. 746 (1914) ; Wilbur v. Stoeppel, 82 Mich. 346, 46 N. W. 724 (1890) ;
Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich. 148, 125 N. W. 72 (1910); Stott v. Stott, 258
Mich. 547, 242 N. W. 747 (1932); Dieckmann v. Robyn, 162 Mo. App. 67,
141 S. W. 717 (1911).
'Hellier v. Achorn, 255 Mass. 273, 151 N. E. 305 (1926), refusing to
recognize a distinction in fact that employment was to continue only so long as
plaintiff "did his best"; Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847
(1891) ; Kreisel v. Distilling Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 5, 47 Atl. 471 (1900). The two
last-cited cases recognize that a stockholders' pooling agreement would be valid
if intended to carry out some corporate policy for the benefit of all stockholders.
See also Rigg v. Railway Co., 191 Pa. 298, 43 Atl. 212 (1899).
Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918).
, Bonta v. Gridley, 77 App. Div. 33, 78 N. Y. Supp. 96 (4th Dept. 1902);
McQuade v. Stoneham, 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1st Dept. 1930);
Harris v. Magill, 131 Misc. 380, 226 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1928) ; Weber v. Della
Mt. Min. Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 Pac. 441 (1908) ; Venner v. Chicago City Ry.
Co., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949 (1913); Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co.,
279 Ill. 54, 116 N. E. 648 (1917); Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash.
62, 114 Pac. 908 (1911); cf. Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 233 (1st Dept. 1919), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919). Contra:
Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487 (1908). But such an agreement "must
be construed as an obligation to retain him only so long as he keeps the agreement on his part faithfully to act as a trustee for the stockholders," Fells v.
Katz. 256 N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931).
' Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. App. 343 (1926).
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An agreement whereby the parties agreed to vote as determined by a majority of them has been sustained. 36 There
is, however, a reluctance specifically to enforce contracts
3
involving corporate control even when valid. 7
It seems futile to attempt any detailed analysis of the
cases in the hope of reconciling them on the basis of "distinguishing" facts, and in preference we shall comment on
the underlying attitudes.
The courts which sustain agreements such as here under
discussion are impressed with the importance of the right
freely to contract.3 8 They have not as yet sought support
in frank recognition of the fact that most stockholders purchase stock for financial return and that it is entirely in harCourts
mony with their attitude to leave control to others.3
which have refused to sanction such agreements have done
so because of a refusal to recognize "sterilized" boards of
directors 40 or because of a refusal to permit the so-called
separation of voting power from beneficial ownership. It
is submitted that in most cases such separation, when voluntary, is entirely proper, and it is difficult to understand
how they can be deemed contrary to "public policy" in states
-which permit the issuance of non-votiig stock or the use of
I Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582
(1897) ; cf. Morel v. Hoge, supra note 34; Sullivan v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221,
74 N. Y. Supp. 787 (1st Dept. 1902). Agreements such as in the Smith case
must be sharply distinguished from "irrevocable proxies." It is well settled
that a proxy to vote stock, not "coupled with an interest," may be revoked even
though it purports to be irrevocable, 3 CooK, CoRPORATIoNs (8th ed. 1923)
2136; 5 FLETCHER, CYC. CoRPs. (Perm. ed.) 187; 2 THompsoN, CORPORATIONS
(3d ed. 1927) §977; 14 C. J. 911; Schmidt v. Mitchell, mepra note 29; Luthy v.
Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1915) ; Randall & Sons, Inc. v. Lucke, mtpra
note 25; Woodruff v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 30 Fed. 91 (S. D. N. Y. 1887).
',Gage v. Fisher, 5 N. D. 297, 65 N. W. 809 (1895) ; Fol's Appeal, 91 Pa.
St. 434 (1879). In McQuade v. Stoneham, mtpra note 34, a complaint asking
for specific performance of an agreement by stockholders to "use their best
endeavors" to continue certain named persons (3 out of 7) as directors and the
plaintiff as treasurer was sustained, but, after trial, the Court refused specific
performance and granted damages (also asked for in the complaint)-142 Misc.
842, 256 N. Y. Sulp. 431 (1932). But in Harris v. Magill, supra note 34, a
motion to restrain plaintiff's removal as director and officer in violation of
agreement was granted.
8E. g., Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 36.
'See smpra note 5.
40 This subject will be discussed hereafter.
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voting trusts. 41 The doctrine against the sale of votes 42 is,
it is submitted, also without substantial merit. The horror
with which courts view such transactions is undoubtedly
directly attributable to their drawing analogies from public
law with its views as to the duties of citizens and public
officials. 43 If there was any validity to the analogy when
corporations were created by private charters establishing
certain definite relations between the corporators and the
sovereign, it vanished when it came to pass that a certificate
of incorporation could be obtained by any one upon the filing of a document in a public office. 4 3a The reasons given
by the courts do not withstand, it seems, close analysis. It
is surely illogical to conclude, as some opinions do, that a
stockholder may not agree with another how he will vote
because he may "vote as he pleases." Nor can consistency
between opinions recognizing the validity of a sale of stock
for the purpose of selling control 44 and those invalidating
a sale of a vote be readily established. The only effect seems
to be to make the purchase of control more expensive in
those cases where the control is not already separated from
ownership by the use of various legal devices which are rec"Of course, in those states where voting trusts are authorized by statute,
there are certain safeguards such as the requirement that the agreement be open
to all stockholders. It may be desirable that all agreements between stockholders as to voting should be filed with the corporation, open to inspection by all
stockholders, in order to be valid.
' See supra notes 30-32.
"E. g., Cone v. Russell & Mason, szpra note 32. In the early days, little
attention was given to the distinction between public and private corporations
(see Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800
(1888) 2 HARV. L. REv. 105, 149, 156), and many inconsistencies in modem
corporation law can be traced to this early confusion. See Gold Bluff Mining
& Lumber Corp. v. Whitlock, 75 Conn. 669 (1903) ; Bergerman, supra note 27;
Note (1931) 44 H.Av.L. REv. 442.
'a See Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 885
(1912) ; Katz v. DeWolf, 151 Wis. 337, 138 N. W. 1013 (1912); Note (1931)
44 HARv. L. REv. 442.
"Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1910) ; Barnes v.
Brown, 80 N. Y. 527 (1880); Delevan v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 154
App. Div. 8, 139 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dept. 1912); Stanton v. Schenck, 140
Misc. 621, 251 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1931); Beitman v. Steiner Bros., 98 Ala. 241,
13 So. 87 (1892) ; Smith v. Gray, 50 Nev. 56, 250 Pac. 369 (1926) ; Keeley v.
Block, 91 N. J. Eq. 520, 111 At. 22 (1920); No. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Walworth,
193 Pa. 207, 44 Atl. 253 (1899); cf. Jacobus v. Diamond S. W. M. Co., 94 App.
Div. 366 88 N. Y. Supp. 302 (1st Dept. 1904); Commonwealth T. & T. Co. v.
Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910) ; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl.
428 (1914) ; Toll's Appeal; Gage v. Fisher, both supra note 37.
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ognized as valid.4 5 The writer is at a, loss for a sound reason why a stockholder should not be permitted to own a share
of common stock, as an investment, free to dispose of its
vote, if corporations are at liberty to sell non-voting securities.4 6 If investors are able to buy non-voting securities,
ordinarily in ignorance of the governing voting provisions,
it. ought to follow that they may voluntarily buy stock with
voting rights and then, in the exercise of their own discretion, sell the voting power, for limited periods, to others for
a consideration. 4 a

This would merely be a frank judicial

"'Forty-two of the 200 largest corporations in the United States are so
controlled, BERLE AND MEANS, Op. cit. supra note 2.
" There may be sound social reasons against the use of non-voting securities
(see Nickel-Plate Unification, 105 I. C. C. 425, 444 (1926) ; Stevens, Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control (1926) 40 QuAR.
JOUR. OF EcoNomics 353, 382, et seq.; RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET
(1927) c. IV), but that question raises basic social and economic questions as
to the extent to which separation of ownership from control ought to be permitted. See Bergerman, supra note 27; BERLE AND MEANS, Op. cit. supra
note 2. The law at present not only recognizes the validity of separation of
ownership from control resulting from the use of non-voting stock and voting
trusts, but in many other ways, see Benkard v. Leonard, 231 App. Div. 625,
248 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dept. 1931), holding that the personal representative
of a deceased settlor, who had reserved the voting rights of trusteed stock,
succeeded thereto in preference to the trustee in whom legal title was vested;
Buffalo Electro-Plating Co. v. Day, 151 App. Div. 237, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1054
(4th Dept. 1912), holding that a director does not forfeit his office by selling
all his stock. A director need not be a stockholder (e. g., N. Y. STOCK CORP.
LAW (1930) §55; see Matter of Ringler & Co., 204 N. Y. 30, 97 N. E. 593
(1912) as to nominal stockholders serving as directors) and a holder of nonvoting stock may be a director (Matter of Haecker, 212 App. Div. 167, 207
N. Y. Supp. 561 (2d Dept. 1925). See also, In re Newcomb, 18 N. Y. Supp. 16
(1891). The Bank for International Settlements affords an interesting example
of a corporation wherein the voting power is separate from the ownership of
its stock; see Reynolds, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 17, 1932.
"a Itmay possibly be argued that stockholders, like infants, should be protected against their own acts, but if that is to become the guiding principle in
corporation law, in order to render it effective, the state must go very much
further than it has. Professor Wormser has said (FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPoRATED-1931, p. 157): "If stockholders refuse or neglect to protect themselves * * * the State must take up the cudgels in their behalf." The opposite
point of view was recently expressed by Mr. William C. Breed (an address,
Feb. 9, 1933), as follows: "The theory of State-constituted guardianship of
investors should be abandoned, * * *. It is an exercise of the sovereign authority in a manner which tends to prevent the development of that caution, sagacity
and character which an investing public must possess if it is to avoid unnecessary loss." Although not unmindful of the fact that "the truth may lie between
the two extremes" (Andrews, The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in Recent
Years and How They Have Affected Substantive Law (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q.
433, 435, 452), the present writer nevertheless deems it appropriate to call attention to the lack of consistency and of policy in the present state of the law on
this subject.
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4
recognition of the fact that "control" has a financial value. 7
It would enable corporations to get the benefit of the higher
prices for which voting stock can be issued in comparison
with non-voting stock and would enable small investors to
realize upon the value of "control" which they do not exercise or even desire. Conversely, it would probably check the

resort to schemes designed to deprive stockholders of their

48
votes against their will.
The original justification for holding that a. stockholder
should not be permitted to barter his vote for a private consideration was the notion that every stockholder was entitled
to the honest and unbiased judgment of every other stock-

holder. This view is at variance with the well settled principle that a stockholder is not disqualified from voting
merely because he is personally interested and that he may
vote so as to best serve his personal interests. 49 It is so
completely unrealistic that the courts are abandoning it."
Much of the confusion in the cases is due to a failure to
distinguish between agreements made by stockholders qua
stockholders and those made by directors qua. directors. 51
It is clear that elected directors should not be permitted to
assume in consideration of a secret profit private obligations
' See Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra note 20a,
at 441; Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450 (1907).
,0 It would also accelerate the development of a professional managerial
class. The more completely management is subjected to the obligations of
fiduciaries the less danger there is in non-voting stock. It is in the temper of
the times to impose such obligations upon those who handle "other peoples'
money." See President Roosevelt's Message to Congress, March 29, 1933;
UNIFORm BUSINESS Co poRATroNS AcT, supra note 19. There has, however,
developed no greater tolerance for non-voting stock. The EMERGENCY BANKING
LAw of March 9, 1933, seems to contemplate that the preferred stock to be
issued by national banks shall have voting powers (§302a) and the form of
by-law drafted by the Comptroller of the Currency thereunder so provides.
"Infra.
"The old theory which seemed to dominate the earlier writers, to the effect
that every stockholder in a corporation is entitled to have the benefit of every
other stockholder in the selection of a board of directors, has necessarily been
rendered obsolete because of our modern business being conducted by large
corporations located in all parts of the country." Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc.,
25 F. (2d) 783, 786 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. den., 278 U. S. 618, 49 Sup. Ct.
22 (1928). The use of uninstructed proxies necessarily involves an abandonment of the notion. See Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 Atl. 136
(Del. Ch. 1933) for an indication of the powers vested by a general proxy in
the attorney.
' E. g., West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507, 10 Sup. Ct. 838 (1890) ; Snow v.
Church, 13 App. Div. 108, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dept. 1897); Haldeman v.
Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917); Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164,
152 Atl. 369 (1930).
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to certain stockholders which may be inconsistent with the
trust duties which they owe to all the stockholders 52 but
it does not follow that stockholders are necessarily subject
to the same limitations. In their case, their agreements as
to voting should be "valid and binding if they do not contravene any express charter or statutory provision or contemplate any fraud, oppression or wrong against other stockholders or other illegal object." 53
It is believed that business ethics can be better served
by compelling faithful adherence to obligations voluntarily
assumed by competent persons than by permitting their
breach because of technical arbitrary rules dissociated from
the justice of the particular case.
RESULTANT LIMITATIONS.

The most liberal views of "freedom of contract" cannot
relieve the majority stockholder from limitations upon his
voting rights. There are inherent limitations resulting,
whether he will or not, from his relationship to other groups
54
interested in the corporation.
Despite his power ultimately to change the management,
the very existence of the board of directors serves sharply to
delimit his voting powers. Stockholders may not control
(that is, directly and avowedly, as by agreement) the directors in the exercise of the discretion vested in them as to the
ordinary business of the corporation or with respect to
powers directly conferred upon them by statute. 55 This result follows from the fact that the statutes confer certain
' Singers-Biggers v. Young, 166 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908).
Manson v. Curtis, supra note 33.
Such legally imperfect obligations as those owing to the general public
and to employees are beyond the scope of this paper, see Dodd, For Whom are
Corporate Managers Trustees (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rav. 1145; Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rav. 1365;
O'LEARY, CORPORATE ENTERPRISE IN MODERN ECONOmic LIFE (1933) c. V. It
has been suggested that the effect on labor should be a factor in determining
between immediate liquidation and continued operation by receivership, Douglas
and Weir, Equity Receiverships (1930) 4 CONN. B. J. 1. 8-9. This by analogy
to the continued operation of utilities for the public's benefit. See Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 252 Fed. 530, 533 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918).
'Manson v. Curtis, supra note 33; Fells v. Katz, supra note 34; Rush v.
Aunspaugh, 179 Ala. 542, 60 So. 802 (1912) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq.
592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910) ; cf. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Amer. Ref. T. Co., 7 F. (2d)
335 (1925), cert. den., 270 U. S. 643 (1926), where an agreement by all the
stockholders with the corporation as to the distribution of its profits was
held valid.
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powers directly upon the directors and they may not therefore be regarded merely as delegated to them by the stockholders, 56 and from the view that directors are fiduciaries
for all the stockholders and may not therefore assume in7
consistent obligations to some of them.
In the absence of express authorization in the statutes
or the charter, directors may not be removed during their
term of office by the stockholders except for cause. 58 Nor
in the absence of such authorization may the board remove
a director.5 9 On the other hand, directors may not extend
their own term by changing the date of election.6 0 Controlling stockholders do, however, possess a method of procuring
a favorable board even between regular elections. They may
increase the number of directors and forthwith proceed to
elect the new additional directors.5 Where
sufficient cause
62
exists, the right of removal is inherent.
'Manson

v. Curtis, supra note 33; Bechtold v. Stillwagon, 119 Misc. 177,

195 N. Y. Supp. 66 (1922), holding invalid by-law vesting election of officers in

stockholders; State v. Daubenspeck, 189 Ind. 243, 123 N. E. 402 (1920), denying
right of stockholders to interfere with directors' by-law-making power.
. Singers-Biggers v. Young, supra note 49; 3 FLETCHFR, CYc. CoRPs.
(Perm. ed.) §838.
' Toledo T. L. & P. Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1913);
People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N. Y. 194, 94 N. E. 634 (1911); Matter
of Korff, 198 App. Div. 553, 190 N. Y. Supp. 664 (1st Dept. 1921) ; Walsh v.
State, 199 Ala. 126, 74 So. 45 (1917). Query, whether such power may be given
by the by-laws, see Matter of Automotive Mfg. Assn., Inc., 120 Misc. 405, 199
N. Y. Supp. 313 (1923).
Raub v. Gerken, 127 App. Div. 42, 111 N. Y. Supp. 319 (2d Dept. 1908).
The Raub case (dicta) and Matter of Schwartz, 119 Misc. 387, 196 N. Y. Supp.
679 (1922) hold valid a by-law adopted by the stockholders vesting such power
in the board. But see Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill. App. 534 (1905).
'Walsh v. State, supra note 58.
'In re Griffing Iron Co., 63 N. J. L. 168, 41 Atl. 931 (1898), aff'd, 63 N.
J.L. 357, 46 At1. 1097 (1899) ; Gold Bluff Mining & Lumber Corp. v. Whitlock,
supra note 43. But a reduction in the number of directors does not serve to
remove those in office, Matter of Manoca Temple Assn., 128 App. Div. 796,
113 N. Y. Supp. 172 (3d Dept. 1908).
' Matter of Koch, 257 N. Y. 318, 178 N. E. 545 (1931); Templeman v.
Grant, 75 Colo. 519, 227 Pac. 555 (1924); Brush v. Natl. Gtee. Credit Corp.,
13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 Atl. 738 (1922). As to what constitutes sufficient cause,
see Matter of Koch, mpra; SPELLMAN, CoRPoRATE DmacvoRs

(1931)

§108.

(Many of the cases cited by Spellman do not involve removal by the corporation.) Where the power to remove exists, judicial review thereof will be limited
to ascertaining whether it has been exercised "fairly and in good faith" and
whether the removed director was given notice and an opportunity to be heard
in his own defense, State v. Brost, 98 W. Va. 596, 127 S. E. 507 (1925). The
procedural requirements of due process may be waived, Matter of Koch, supra.
Judicial procedure for the removal of directors for misconduct is sometimes
provided by statute (e. g., N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW (1929) §60); but in the
absence thereof courts have no inherent jurisdiction to remove corporate officers,
Johnstone v. Jones, 23 N. J.Eq. 216 (1872).
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Until comparatively recently it could have been said
with a fair degree of assurance that stockholders were not
trustees for each other. a From this premise it follows that
they may vote upon matters in which they are personally
interested 64 and that their motives may not be inquired into
by a court.' 5 A stockholder may not be deprived of his vote
upon a charge that he proposes to vote in a manner which
6
the others deem detrimental to the corporation.

However, majority stockholders have never been accorded free rein by the courts ta do as they will with the corpora-

tion.

They may not, over the objection of the minority,

embark it upon ultra vires ventures, 67 commit fraud,68 or

treat the minority unfairly or inequitably.6 9
I Windmuller v. Standard Distilling & D. Co., 114 Fed. 491 (C. C. N. J.
1902) ; Niles v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 144, 74 N. Y. Supp. 617
(1st Dept. 1902), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 119, 68 N. E. 142 (1903); Shaw v. Davis,
78 Md. 308, 28 Atl. 619 (1894).
' DuPont v. DuPont, 251 Fed. 937 (D. D. Del. 1918), affd (except as to
costs), 256 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919), cert. den., 249 U. S. 599, 39 Sup. Ct.
492 (1919) ; Gamble v. Queens C. W. Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 91 (1890) ;
Socorro M. M. Co. v. Preston, 17 Misc. 220, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1040 (1896) ; Gen.
Inv. Co. v. American H. & L. Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 214, 127 Atl. 529 (1925);
United States Steel Co. v. Hodge, 64 N. J. Eq. 807, 54 Atl. 1 (1903).
Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 20 Fed. 577, app. dis. 136 U. S. 645
(1890), s. c. 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886); DuPont v. DuPont, supra
note 64; Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Baggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17
(1903).
'Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 (1917); Holcomb v. Forsyth,
216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927); Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264
Mass. 499, 163 N. E. 184 (1928) ; Camden & Atlantic R. R. v. Elkins, 37 N. J.
Eq. 273 (1883) ; Elevator Supplies Co. v. Wylde, 106 N. J. Eq. 163, 150 Atl.
347 (1930).
' Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. 363 (1888) ; Murrin v. Archbold Cons. Coal Co., 232 N. Y. 541, 134 N. E. 563 (1921); Manderson v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 379 (1857); Langolf v. Seiberlitch, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas.
64 (Pa. 1851). For additional cases, see 3 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923)
§669; 13 FLETCHER, CYC. CORPS. (Perm. ed.) §§5823-8; 4 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§2906-8. As the result of increasingly liberal corporation
statutes and the use of the broadest possible terminology in certificates of
incorporation, this limitation has lost its early importance, see Note (1932) 45
HARV. L. REv. 1374, 1393.

Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886);
Flynn v. Bklyn. City R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 493, 53 N. E. 520 (1899) ; Hinds v.
Fishkill & M. Gas Co., 96 App. Div. 14, 88 N. Y. Supp. 954 (1st Dept. 1904).
There is no "definition" of "fraud" beyond "the immemorial test of fair and
conscientious dealing," see Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E.
60 (1933).
' Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1919);
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 763 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906) ; Godley
v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914); Colby v.
Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. Supp. 978 (1st Dept. 1908),
aff'd, 192 14. Y. 535, 84 N. E. 1111 (1908), majority sustained; Outwater v.
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The application of these limitations is sharply restricted in practice by the doctrine that courts will not interfere
with the discretion of the majority on matters of business
policy,7 0 but there persists the notion that the majority do
in fact owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. The obligations of trustees have been imposed upon stockholders
when acting under statutory power to make a corporate
decision, 71 and in favor of the holders of non-voting securities,7 2 and against majority stockholders who do in fact direct the affairs of the corporation as distinguished from those
7 3
who merely have the power to elect controlling directors.
The distinction has been well put in Robotham v. Prudential
Insurance Co.: 74

"Authorities have been cited to support the proposition that an individual or a corporation holding a
Public Service Corp., 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (1928), aff'd, 104 N. J.
Eq. 490, 146 At. 916 (1929) ; Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 101 N. J.Eq.
543, 138 Atl. 772 (1927), aff'd, 107 N. J.Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 402 (1931), majority
sustained. On the general subject of the rights of the minority against the
majority, see Rohrlich, Suits im Equity by Minority Stockholders as a Means
of Corporate Control (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 692.
'Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., supra note 65; Gamble v. Queens
C. W. Co., supra note 64; Burden v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287, 54 N. E. 17 (1899);
Madsen
v. Burns Bros., 108 N. J. Eq. 275, 155 Atl. 28 (1931).
7'
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. 185, 123 N. E. 148
(1919), dissolution. Contra: Windmuller v. Standard D. & D. Co., supra
note 63. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., supra note 69, consolidation;
Wheeler v. Abilene Natl. Bk. Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908), sale
of assets.
' Kidd v. Traction Co., 74 N. H. 160, 66 Atl. 127 (1907) ; Uniform Business Corporations Act, supra note 19; Berle, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers
Control" (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 673.
SMeeker v. Winthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. 48 (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1883);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Y. & N. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 410, 430, 44 N. E.
1043 (1896) ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., supra note 69; Kidd v. Traction Co., supra note 72. See also Wood, The Status of Management Stockholders (1928) 38 YALE L. J.57. A minority may occupy the position of
trustee if in fact it controls (for instance, with the aid of proxies), Hyams v.
Calumet & Hecla Min. Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915). If the fact of
control be there, the technique or manner of its exercise is of no importance,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, supra note 69. In Wheeler v. Abilene Nat]. Bk.
Bldg. Co., supra note 71, at 393-4, the Court said: "The holder of the majority
of the stock of a corporation has the power, by the election of biddable directors
and by the vote of his stock, to do everything that the corporation can do. His
power to control and direct places him in its shoes, and constitutes him the
actual, if not the technical trustee for the holders of the minority of the stock."
But in that case, the majority of the stock was owned by one person who was
also a director and president of the corporation. See also Harrison v. Thomas,
112 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 5th, 1901) ; Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N. Y. Supp.
860 (1894) ; Tefft v. Schaeffer, 148 Wash. 602, 269 Pac. 1048 (1928).
"64 N. J.Eq. 673, 689-690, 53 Atl. 842, 848 (1903).
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majority of the capital stock of another corporation
sustains, by reason of such holding a fiduciary relation to the minority stockholders. But these authorities only hold, in effect, that the fiduciary relation
arises when the majority stockholder assumes control
of the corporation and dictates the action of the directors. The majority stockholder is not made a trustee for the minority stockholders in any sense by the
mere fact that he holds a majority of the stock, or by
the further fact that he uses the voting power of his
stock to elect a board. of directors for the corporation.
The majority stockholder does not necessarily control the directors whom he appoints, and, in fact, he
has no right to control them, and if they are controlled by him, they may be violating their duty, for
which he also may be liable. * * * No liability of the
majority stockholder to the minority stockholder for
the misdeeds of his common trustees-the directorscan arise from the mere fact that the majority stockholder had the power to appoint, or, in fact, did appoint, these trustees. Such liability, however, may
arise if the majority stockholder has made the derelict trustees his agents and dictated their conduct and
thus caused a breach of fiduciary duty."
JUDICIAL CONTROL.

75

The proper procedure 76 to test the validity of corporate
77
elections aild title to corporate office is by quo warrato,
and mandamus is ordinarily the proper method to compel
the holding of elections in accordance with the governing
'The matter is in some states covered in part by statute, see 5 FLETCHER,
CYC. CORPS. (Perm. ed.) §2073. On the general subject of judicial redress on
behalf of minority stockholders against the majority and "stockholders' suits,"
see Rohrlich, supra note 69.
6Except

as modified by statute; e. g., N. Y.

GEN. CORP. LAW

(1929)

§25.

' Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 53 (N. Y. 1860); Brooks v. State ex rel.
Richards, 29 Del. 1, 79 Atl. 790 (1911) ; Deal v. Miller, 245 Pa. 1, 90 Atl. 1070
(1914). In Massachusetts, quo warranto may not be used in private corporations, Haupt v. Rogers, 170 Mass. 71, 48 N. E. 1080 (1898). For collection of
cases, see "Quo Warranto, or Information in Nature of Quo Warranto, To Test

Title to Office in Private Corporation," Note (1914) 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1126.
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law.78 Mandamus will also issue to inspectors of election
79
directing them to receive votes entitled to be cast.
However, when a suit is properly pending in equity the
court will determine all questions of title to office or validity
of elections which may incidentally arise therein or the determination of which is necessary to enable it to do complete

justice. 80 Ordinarily, equity prefers to give redress against
specific wrongs and not interfere with corporate voting per
se, 81 but it has acted directly in a large number of cases by
injunction. Thus: Corporations have been restrained from
voting majority stock held ultra vires in rival competing corporations;82 voting on stock title to which, or the voting
power of which, is in dispute has been restrained pendente
lite 83 but not necessarily in every case where the plaintiff
People ex reL Miller v. Cummings, 72 N. Y. 433 (1878) ; Walsh v. State,
199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 (1917) ; Bassett v. Atwater, 65 Conn. 355, 32 Atl. 937
(1894); Cella v. Davidson, 304 Pa. 389, 156 Atl. 99 (1931) ; cf. Lutz v. Webster,-"Matter
249 Pa. 226,
94 Atl. 834 (1915).
of Young
v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N. Y. Supp. 61 (4th
Dept. 1925). Inspectors of election are ministerial officers, Matter of Cecil,
36 How. Pr. 477 (N. Y. 1869) ; Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., supra
note 50. Mandamus may also lie to compel persons wrongfully claiming office
to deliver up books, American Railway-Frog Co. v. Haven, 101 Mass. 398
(1869).
1 Deal v. Miller, spra note 77; Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Baggiano,
202 Ill. 312, 67 N. E. 17 (1903); West Side Hospital v. Steele, 124 Ill. App.
534 (1906) ; Mechanics Natl. Bank v. Burnet Mfg. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 236 (1880).
Davidson v. American Blower Co., 243 Fed. 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
= Steele v. United Fruit Co., 190 Fed. 631 (C. C. E. D. La. 1911), aff'd,
194 Fed. 1023 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912); Milbank v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co.,
64 How. Pr. 20 (N. Y. 1882) ; George v. Central R. R. & Bkg. Co., 101 Ala.
607, 14 So. 752 (1893); Memphis v. Charleston R. Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630,
7 So. 108 (1889); Dunbar v. Amer. Tel. Co., 224 Ill. 9, 79 N. E. 423 (1906).
But an injunction will not be granted where the stock is legally held merely
because of possible danger to the minority, Oelbermann v. N. Y. & N. Ry. Co.,
77 Hun 332, 29 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1894) ; Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Min. Co.,
167 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); Toledo T. L. & P. Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed.
643 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1913) ; see also supra note 66.
'Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) ; Harper v. Smith,
93 App. Div. 608 (lst Dept. 1904); Stewart v. Pierce, 116 Iowa 733, 89 N. W.
234 (1902). The voting of issued but unauthorized stock may also be enjoined,
Haskell v. Read, 68 Neb. 107, 93 N. W. 997 (1903), rehearing denied, 68 Neb.
107, 96 N. W. 1007 (1907). The stockholder is a necessary party to an injunction suit against his stock being voted, General Inv. -Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S.
Ry. Co., 250 Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Talbot J. Taylor Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 122 Fed. 147 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1903); Jones v. Nassau S. H. Co.,
53 Misc. 63, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1089 (1907) ; Bouree v. Trust Francais, 14 Del.
Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (1924). Where the stock in question represents control,
an injunction may be obtained not only by its claimants but also by minority
stockholders, the minority, however, being restrained from holding elections
while such injunction against the majority stock is in force, Villamil v. Hirsch,
138 Fed. 690, 143 Fed. 654 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905-6).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

claims the stock from defendant ;84 registered owners not entitled to vote have been restrained from doing so.C And
the injunctive powers of equity are broad enough to meet
special situations that may arise.86 Occasionally equity will
even use its powers in order to direct the manner in which
votes shall be cast and to control the subjects submitted to
stockholders for action.

In Byington v. Piazza,

7

persons

holding stock under an agreement whereby they were required to vote in favor of the re-election of the "present
Board of Directors" were restrained from voting to increase
the board from five to seven. 88 The submission of a by-law
which would be illegal to a stockholders' meeting was enjoined where the notice of the meeting did not sufficiently
advise the stockholders of the effect of their voting in favor
thereof. s9
One of the extraordinary powers of equity with respect
to corporate elections is the power to appoint special mas' Lucas v. Millikan, 139 Fed. 816 (C. C. So. Car. 1905), action for specific
performance of agreement to sell; Maine Products Co. v. Alexander, 115 App.
Div. 112, 100 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dept. 1906), action to rescind sale but
injunction against resale by defendant granted.
'Pledgees: Haskell v. Read, supra note 83; McHenry v. Jewett, 26 Hun
453 (N. Y. 1882) ; cf. Granite Brick Co. v. Titus, 226 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 4th,
1915). Voting rights as between pledgor and pledgee are now frequently
regulated by statute, e. g., N. Y. Stock Corporation Law (1930) §47. Escrow
Agent: Butler v. Standard Milk Flour Co., 146 App. Div. 735, 131 N. Y. Supp.
451 (1st Dept. 1911). See also Com. ex rel. Langdon v. Patterson, 158 Pa. 476,
27 Atl. 998 (1893).
' Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 252 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918), stockholders restrained from voting while corporation in hands of equity
receiver. Millspaugh v. Cassedy, 191 App. Div. 221, 181 N. Y. Supp. 276 (2d
Dept. 1920) is a very special case. There the certificate of incorporation filed
in 1908 failed to exclude the preferred stock from voting power but the
by-laws did in accordance with the understanding of the incorporators. The
preferred stockholders did not claim the right to vote for twenty years and then
when they did the Court made a decree reforming the certificate of incorporation.
' 131 App. Div. 895, 115 N. Y. Supp. 918 (1st Dept. 1909). See also Ripin
v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 885 (1912).
'Cf. Lersner v. Adair Mach. Co., 137 N. Y. Supp. 565 (1912), where the
Court refused to restrain the majority stockholder from voting to decrease the
board and then ousting the plaintiff merely because of the probability that such
new board might release the majority stockholder from certain claims. "It is
an unheard-of thing that stockholders of a corporation can be enjoined from
voting on the ground that the persons they may vote for to manage it may
possibly abuse their trust." Lucas v. Milliken, supra note 84, at 833.
' Scott v. P. Lorrillard Co., 108 N. J. Eq. 153, 154 Atl. 515 (1931), aff'd,
109 N. 3. Eq. 417, 157 Atl. 388 (1931) ; cf. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F. (2d) 109
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; but certiorari granted by U. S. Sup. Ct. (April 10, 1933)
and see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust
Co., -

U. S. -,

53 Sup. Ct. 295 (1933).
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ters to conduct them.9 0 The power will be exercised when
sufficient reason is shown for anticipating that a fair and
honest election cannot be held because of the danger of fraud,
violence or other unlawful conduct.9 1
No decree may justify the voting of stock in a manner
92
contrary to statute or public policy.
CHESTER RORLICH.

New York City.

'This power may, of course, be limited by statute or rule, see Yetter v.
Delaware Vy. R. R. Co., 206 Pa. 485, 56 Atl. 57 (1903); cf. Deal v. Erie Coal
& Coke Co., 248 Pa. 48, 93 Atl. 829 (1915).
"' Bartlett v. Gates, 118 Fed. 66 (C. C. Colo. 1902); Tunis v. Hestonville,
M. & F. P. R. R. Co., 149 Pa. 70, 83, 24 Atl. 88 (1892); Deal v. Erie Coal &
Coke Co., su~pra note 90; Dick v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 4 Pa. Dist. 56
(1895). For the powers of such master, see In re Petition of Gulla, 13 Del.
Ch. 23 (1921).
People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923).

